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Abstract. In this paper, a game between two bookmakers is analysed. The simple
game involves high or low odds strategies for each bookmaker, and an inherent
Prisoner’s Dilemma structure is revealed. However, this structure may be partially
resolved given parametric changes in profit structures that might lead to a “Stag
Hunt Game”.
An argument for possible bookmaker arbitrage is added. Although this argument
is well known, it is sparsely treated in research literature. A proof of the necessity
of differing beliefs between gamblers to obtain bookmaker arbitrage is added.
1. Introduction
Wagering markets are surprisingly well described in Economic literature, both
theoretically and empirically (see, e.g. [2, 4–6, 8, 11]). According to Thaler and
Ziemba [9], there are good reasons for this. They argue that this industry con-
tains transactions where the termination point of uncertain outcomes (of bets)
are well defined. This, (for instance) in contrast to financial markets, where such
future uncertainty resolvability is far less clearly defined. Combined with the fact
that data from the betting industry is available, this industry is interesting as an
empirical “laboratory” to test economists’ hypotheses and models.
Of special interest for this paper is the concept of arbitrage. The main topic
here, as the title and abstract suggest, is related to a strategic analysis of possible
cooperation and conflict between bookmakers. For such a gaming situation to
make sense, some basic structural points related to profit potential in this industry
seems relevant.
It is a well known fact that arbitrage (or secure profit options) exists in real
wagering markets [7]. A very simple example may for instance be observed in [10].
The point is simple. If more than one bookmaker exist, and at least two book-
makers give different odds on the same uncertain outcome, a possibility for an
arbitrage on the hand of a gambler exists. As odds and probabilities are inter-
linked1, it should not come as a surprise that an arbitrage opportunity on the
bookmakers’ hand also exists. This option, seemingly less discussed in academic
literature (see [1, 3] for 2 exceptions) will be discussed in greater detail in what
follows.
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, where p is probability and o is odds.
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Consider (as shown in Figure 1) a bookmaker offering two different gambles
(G1, G2) to (at least) two different gamblers who have different probabilities (p

















Figure 1. Two gambles offered to two gamblers.
The gambles G1 and G2 offered work as follows. If outcome A is realised,
a gambler accepting G1 will get paid x, x > 0 from the bookmaker, but will have
to pay the bookmaker x + ε (ε > 0) if the outcome is B. Gamble G2 is (pay-off-
wise) inversely constructed so that the gambler receives x given B, but must pay
x+ ε given A.
Now, an interesting feature is the total pay-off received by the bookmaker. If
outcome A is realised, he will have to pay x from G1, but will receive x+ ε from
G2. Obviously, the opposite happens if B is the outcome, and the bookmaker
receives ε no matter what outcome. Hence, the bookmaker is guaranteed a profit
of ε if he can find gamblers accepting both G1 and G2. We can check this option
by checking the expected pay-offs and securing those to be positive for potential
gamblers. Assuming risk neutral gamblers, we then get:
px+ (1− p)(−x− ε) > 0,
q(−x− ε) + (1− q)x > 0,














and p and q must be different. A small proof of the generality of this feature is
offered in appendix A. Hence, we have shown and argued that the differences in
the odds offered or in the gamblers’ beliefs (probabilities) open up arbitraging op-
portunities. Furthermore, such opportunities only open up if such differing beliefs
(in odds and probabilities) exist. The modern game theory has taken this discus-
sion much further, it has even received a name – The Harsanyi Doctrine – refer,
for instance, to [1]. The point here, is not to repeat this discussion, but rather to
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observe the following fact: One of these arbitraging opportunities acts in favour of
the bookmakers (the last one), while the first one acts in favour of the gamblers.
Gamblers and bookmakers play a zero-sum game, and what one group gains the
other does not. The simple point here, is that given the information availability
and openness of odds, it is hard to accept that arbitraging opportunities for gam-
blers would exist persistently. On the other hand, a bookmakers opportunity to
construct gambles with arbitraging possibilities for himself may be much harder
to reveal, even through the Internet. As such, it seems safe to conclude that these
options to some extent explain how bookmakers can run their business profitably.
The same conclusion seems obvious if we observe the reality. Bookmakers and
casino owners exist and some of them are really big these days, with aggressive
marketing in traditional marketing channels like TV-adverts. Thus, identifying
real world profits is not hard.
2. The bookmaker’s dilemma
2.1. A simplified bookmaker market
In Section 1, arguments for the existence of profits for bookmakers were given.
Assume now, that the single bookmaker situation is changed into a two-bookmaker
one. Hence, two bookmakers (with potential to earn profits) exist in a simplified
bookmaker market. In this situation, competition between bookmakers arises,
and, which is also obvious, the competitive means of the bookmakers are odds.
As greedy gamblers incentives to choose one bookmaker over the other are solely
related to the size of the odds, the main strategic choices for bookmakers are their
odds setting. High odds (given low odds for the other) would draw gamblers to
a bookmaker.
In a real world situation, other means than odds such as the quality of the web-
site, brand, rumour etc. may influence the gamblers’ decisions, but these effects
are (for simplistic reasons) ruled out here.
As the main cost for a bookmaker is also related to odds, it seems evident that
the profits earned by an individual bookmaker depend on his odds-strategy. That
is, the higher the odds a bookmaker sets, the more he will have to pay to the
winners, and the less he will earn. On the other hand, high odds increases the
likelihood of attracting gamblers.
2.2. A two-player bookmaker game
Based on the arguments in Subsection 2.1, the following imperfect but complete
information game is defined:
i) The game contains two players - bookmakers, named B1 and B2.
ii) Each player chooses between high and low odds strategies, oH , oL, respec-
tively. (oL < oH .)
iii) The market situation is assumed such, that two possible profit options may
arise. If both players choose the same odds-strategy, profits are divided
equally among them. However, if they choose different strategies, the one
choosing the low-odds strategy (oL) takes the whole market. A choice of
high odds reduces the profits compared to a low odds situation. Hence,
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πL, πH
2, defines profits corresponding to odds choices oH , oL respectively.
As a consequence, if one or both players choose the oH -strategy, profits
earned are πL. If both choose the oL strategy, the high profit option of
πH is obtained
iv) The bookmakers cannot observe each other’s odds strategy before they
have to decide their own odds. Hence, the game may be considered being
simultaneous; that is, a game of imperfect information.
v) All information in points i) - iv) above is known by both players, and no
additional information is available. Consequentially, the game has com-
plete information.

























Figure 2. A simultaneous game of complete information between two bookmakers.
2.3. Game analysis – Nash equilibria
Figure 3 contains best replies for the game. The solid (red) circles (best reply
function for B1) and squares (best reply function for B2) will be unchangeable as
πL







the game contains a single unique Nash equilibrium (NE) where both players
chose the high-odds strategy. We name this NE: {oH , oH}. Refer to the left part
of Figure 4. If we rule out the highly unlikely πL =
πH
2 -alternative, the only


























Figure 3. Game with best replies.
























































Figure 4. The two only possible NE-structures in the game.
The game on the right in Figure 4 contains 3 NE’s, two in pure strategies and
one in mixed strategies. The two pure strategy NE’s involve a coordinated solution,
both players do the same, but they either choose to set high odds - {oH , oH} or low
odds - {oL, oL}. The “invisible” mixed strategy NE involves both players choosing
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either oH or oL with (easily computable) probabilities. The actual probability-
values of the mixed strategy NE are of no further importance here and, thus, are
not added.
3. Conclusions
The main interesting observation in the analysis in Subsection 2.2, is the structure
of the leftmost NE of Figure 4. Here, a unique NE where each bookmaker chooses
to set high odds ({oH , oH}) is the game prediction. This may seem as good news
for gamblers, but the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure is evident. Observe that the
total profit generated by the two bookmakers in this market is πL2 +
πL
2 = πL. At
the same time, it is easily observed that the “opposite” coordination alternative –
{oH , oH} provides a larger total profit for each of the players – as πH2 +
πH
2 = πH .
(πH > πL by assumption.) As a consequence, cooperative activity by bookmakers
should be expected. A cartel (much like OPEC) may be expected.
If the bookmaker market is compared to the oil market, it is easy to see the sig-
nificant differences. The oil producers must keep their cartel steady after observing
price changes while the real relevant (more or less unobservable) variable is the
production quantities. However, the bookmakers can easily (at least in principle
through the Internet) control each other’s odds and, thus, it should (logically) be
expected that it is far easier to maintain a cartel for bookmakers than oil produc-
ers. As OPEC has managed to keep a high oil price (well above marginal costs)
for more than 40 years, it is easy to suspect that bookmaker odds perhaps are not
as high as they should be.
Furthermore, to some extent, this situation may be viewed as follows: If πL is
relatively close (in value) to πH , we can interpret the market situation as reason-
ably competitive. Such a situation would make the {oH , oH} NE more probable.
And, (obviously) if a cartel formation tendency is evident, the probability of such
an occurrence will increase. On the other hand, if πH >> πL, the {oH , oH}
becomes an NE. Not a unique one though, but still.
Thus, to some extent, our model indicates that, no matter how profits are dis-
tributed, the bookmakers can end up as winners. As such, this conclusion should
not be very surprising, not many sound people recommend gambling activities.
However, our simple game model indicates another type of argument against gam-
bling activities.
Appendix A. A proof of generality for p 6= q
The gambles (or lotteries) of Figure 1 are generalised3 as in Figure 5.
As before; x, y, ε1, ε2 > 0 To secure arbitrage for the bookmaker, the following
two inequalities must be satisfied:
y + ε2 − x > 0,
x+ ε1 − y > 0,
3These gambles are of course not completely generalized by given sign restrictions. However, it




















Figure 5. Generalized gambles - G1 and G2.
or
ε2 > x− y, (A.1)
ε1 > y − x. (A.2)
As inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) indicate, this poses no problems, as simply
adding left and right sides of these inequalities produce ε1 + ε2 > 0 which, given
the assumption of positive ε-s, poses no problems.
However, arbitrage for the bookmaker is not enough. It is also necessary that
positive expected values for the gamblers can be constructed. Then:
px+ (1− p)(−x− ε1) > 0, (A.3)
q(−y − ε2) + (1− q)y > 0. (A.4)















Figure 6. Position of p and q when p = q is a possibility.
Now, let us show that p must be unequal to q by an “ad absurdum” argument,
starting with p = q and show that this is impossible. If p should be able to equal
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As, x, y, ε1, ε2 > 0⇒ (2x+ ε1), (2y + ε2) > 0, and (A.5) becomes:
⇒ (x+ ε1)(2y + ε2) < y(2x+ ε1)
or
⇒ 2xy + xε2 + 2yε1 + ε1ε2 < 2xy + yε1
and finally
⇒ ε2(x+ ε1) < −yε1. (A.6)
Now, given non negativity assumptions on all variables, −yε1 (on the right-hand
side in (A.6)) must be negative, while the expression on the left-hand side is clearly
positive. Consequently, p = q is impossible, and in order to achieve arbitrage and
gambles with positive expected values (which risk neutral gamblers would accept),
p and q must be different. 
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